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Abstract The greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme in the European Union
primarily uses grandfathering until 2012, which means that polluters get emission
rights free of charge based on their historical emissions. Energy consumers accuse
energy producers of making windfall profits by incorporating the market value of
those free rights into the energy prices. However, we develop a numerical example
to illustrate that the reasoning of the producers is correct. We also explain why this
market value is only partly passed on to consumers. We consider various measures
and conclude that only auctioning the rights after 2012 nullifies the additional
profits.
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In 2003, the European Union (EU) adopted Directive 2003/87/EC on greenhouse
gas emissions trading. This market started in 2005. The Directive requires that
governments allocate the emission rights free of charge. This means that polluters
do not have to buy their emission rights, or allowances, in an auction. Instead the
allowances are allocated free of charge to polluters, based on their historical
emissions. This way of allocating is called grandfathering. Article 10 of the
Directive specifies that for the period 2005–2007 at least 95% of the allowances
should be handed out for free and at least 90% for the current period 2008–2012.
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The energy industry is the largest sector in the scheme, responsible for more than
half of total covered emissions (Christiansen et al. 2005).
In spite of the increased acceptance of emissions trading, some of its institutional
elements are still controversial, especially the allocation mechanism and the setting
of the Member States’ emission caps (e.g. Neuhoff et al. 2006). The decision to
grandfather the allowances lead to a ‘significant outcry about windfall profits’
(Ellerman and Buchner 2007: 73). Econometric research has confirmed that energy
producers partly pass on the market value of freely obtained CO2 emission rights to
energy consumers (e.g. Point Carbon 2008; Smale et al. 2006; Frontier Economics
2006; Sijm et al. 2005). This was and still is a ‘‘hot item’’ in the political and public
debate: newspapers and policy magazines all over Europe have written about the
windfall profits those companies would make. Also some economists have
expressed their concerns about those particular gains (e.g. Jepma 2006). Moreover,
with respect to defining the national caps, EU Member States have been generous in
allocating the emission rights, at least for the period 2005–2007 (e.g. Ellerman and
Buchner 2006; Bo¨hringer et al. 2005). As a consequence, the call for measures
against the windfall profits from emissions trading became louder and louder (e.g.
Grubb and Neuhoff 2006; Whitehead 2005).
For the time being, this has resulted in a more or less consensual approach within
Member States to allocate relatively stringent emission ceilings to the power sector
for the period 2008–2012. For the period after 2012, the European Commission
proposed to auction off all allowances to the electricity industry (COM 2008). The
European Council agreed, but also made an exemption for existing power generators
in primarily Eastern European Member States, where the auctioning rate must be at
least 30% in 2013 and 100% in 2020 (EC 2008: 3, 14).
With the introduction of a market for emission rights, CO2 would be priced,
making it more expensive to pollute. However, the research reports and newspaper
articles suggest that polluters now make additional profits by incorporating these
rights as ‘‘opportunity costs’’ in the calculation of the cost price. At first glance, the
indignation of consumers seems right, because the producers appear to receive and
use those rights for free. Free emission rights do not seem to show up as direct costs
in the cost price. Yet we argue that passing on the market value of these rights as
costs to the consumers is economically correct and that various implemented and
contemplated measures against windfall profits will not make an end to those gains.
Contrary to some complex reports on this matter, and the sometimes confusing
newspaper stories, we will make our point by developing a simple but relevant
numerical example, based on micro-economic theory.
We use this example to answer the following central question: should energy
consumers pay for the allowances that energy producers obtained for free? When
elaborating upon and answering this question, we primarily focus on the supply side
of markets. Of course, energy prices are determined by supply and demand, but we
analyze the value and costs of emission rights as one of the production factors that
determine supply curves, because this aspect of the market has recently created so
much controversy. Our article can be seen as part of the emerging literature on the
interactions between climate policy and energy policy (e.g. Bonacina and Gullı`
2007; Sijm et al. 2006).
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The article is structured as follows. In Sect. 1, we explain the economic impact of
the opportunity costs of grandfathered allowances on energy prices, assuming price-
taking behaviour. In Sect. 2, we take a look at the limits of passing on opportunity
costs that appear to exist in practice, including the impact of energy oligopolies. In
Sect. 3, we analyze the economic consequences of measures that aim to tackle the
windfall profits that energy companies make, including auctioning. In Sect. 4, we
not only sketch the pros, but also some cons of auctioning as an alternative to
circumvent those additional profits. In Sect. 5 we draw conclusions.
1 The impact of opportunity costs on energy prices
Do energy companies make windfall profits from emissions trading? To answer this
question we briefly indicate how emissions trading works and clearly define the
term windfall profits. Under the Kyoto Protocol the EU is committed to achieving
an 8% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2008–2012 compared to emission
levels in 1990. Emissions trading is an instrument to reach that target. In the EU
system, the emissions are capped and polluters are allowed to trade emissions in the
form of emission rights. At least until 2012, they primarily receive those rights,
called allowances, for free. If participants decide to trade, the buyer is allowed to
emit more, but the seller must emit less (e.g. Dales 1968). This scheme is both
effective and efficient: the environmental target is met at lowest costs (e.g.
Woerdman 2005).
However, the emissions trading scheme is not without problems. Energy
companies are now accused of making windfall profits. These are the profits due to
the introduction of the emissions trading scheme. Windfall profits arise because
producers pass on the market value of the emission rights to consumers via a mark-
up on energy prices, while the producers obtained those rights for free. Should
energy consumers pay for the allowances that energy producers obtained for free?
The answer is yes. The crucial reason being that emission rights obtained free of
charge have ‘‘opportunity costs’’ (e.g. Grafton and Devlin 1996; Nentjes et al.
1995).
In economics, the concept of opportunity cost must be taken into account
whenever a resource can be used in alternative ways (Varian 2003). In general,
when you consume more of good 1, you may have to give up some consumption of
good 2. If that is the case, giving up the opportunity to consume good 2 is the
economic cost of more consumption of good 1. A more concrete example is the
wage rate. The wage rate is not only the price of labour, it is also the opportunity
cost of leisure. If your salary is €20 per hour, then an extra hour of leisure costs you
€20 in forgone income.
A similar reasoning can be applied to emission rights. Instead of using the free
allowances, the firm could have sold them at the current market price. When selling
its output, for instance electricity, the firm wants to recover this opportunity forgone
in the product price. An emissions trading scheme puts a price on residual
emissions, which means that they are no longer for free. ‘‘Consuming’’ the right to
emit when producing output is a cost to the firm. If producers are to be motivated
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not to sell those rights, then the proceeds of such a sale need to be compensated via
the energy prices. In other words: although an energy producer does not have to pay
for the emission rights, he does employ them to cover the emissions when producing
output and therefore he must pass on the value of those rights in the product price.
Below, we illustrate this with a numerical example.
1.1 Numerical example
Let us consider the example of energy producers. They are assumed to be price-
takers, which means that these producers take energy prices and allowance prices as
given. Suppose that prior to the introduction of a system of tradable emission rights,
at time t = 0, the cost price of, say, a unit of electricity is €65, consisting of €50 fuel
costs, €10 capital costs and €5 labour costs. The normal profit is €5. In equilibrium,
the market price for a unit of electricity is then €70 (excluding indirect taxes and
distribution costs). The left side of Fig. 1 illustrates that with the introduction of an
emissions trading scheme, at time t = 1, the market value of the free allowances is
added to this price. (Note that the right side of Fig. 1 is not referred to here and will
be used later on in this article). Suppose that the market value of an allowance
implies a €20 mark-up on the electricity price (i.e. from the market price of an
emission right per unit of CO2 producers derive a mark-up per unit of electricity).
Including the normal profit, the electricity price becomes €90 per unit of electricity.
The market value of the emission rights is then fully passed on to consumers. The
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reason being that the producer could have sold those rights. He will not sell if and
only if he can earn the revenue forgone via the electricity price.
In his published yearly accounts the producer will report a total profit per unit of
electricity of €25 and, second, the normal profit of €5. This is clearly a situation in
which reporting the results in the yearly accounts differs from economic reality:
there is only an economic profit of €5, while €20 is necessary to compensate for the
opportunity costs of using the rights.
1.2 Popular misconceptions
The cause of the windfall profits, that is grandfathering, is not always well
understood in the climate change literature and popular press. The following quote
taken from an interview with Kevin Smith, a researcher with Carbon Trade Watch,
illustrates this: ‘Governments massively over allocated emissions permits to the
heaviest polluting industries in the initial round. This resulted in windfall profits for
some of the biggest polluters who in exaggerating their need for emissions
allowances, received enormous amounts of permits that they could then profitably
sell on’ (in: Cunningham 2007: 27–28). This is indeed a popular view, but it is not
correct.
Windfall profits should not be confused with profits arising from ‘‘over-
allocation’’, meaning that companies get more (in this case free) allowances then
they need, which they can sell for cash on the market (provided that there is still
sufficient demand). Over-allocation arises solely from leniency in the setting of the
emission target; windfall profits arise solely from the allocation method of
grandfathering. With stringent targets, electricity producers will still realize windfall
profits, because the grandfathered allowances entail opportunity costs for them.
However, with a smaller number of free allowances, the price of those rights will be
higher. Therefore, a more stringent emission cap does not necessarily reduce the
size of the windfall profits, but might even increase those profits.
Although over-allocation should thus not be confused with windfall profits, they
are intertwined in the sense that over-allocation in principle should lead to a low (or
zero) carbon price, resulting in low (or no) windfall profits. This only occurred
during 2007 after data on over-allocation had been published. Forward sales in 2007
of allowances, though, did not suffer from over-allocation (with prices ranging
between about €12 and €24), since those allowances are to be used in the more
stringent 2008–2012 period (COM 2007).
Others question the opportunity costs reasoning all together and suspect that it is
wrong to pass on the market price of free allowances to consumers in the first place.
Jepma, for instance, writes: ‘Because allowances are grandfathered, and most
installations seem to succeed in passing on allowance prices onto end users without
being charged accordingly, they eventually capture windfall profits. […] [T]he
group that eventually pays for the rent […], is the group of final end users, or
consumers, who eventually pay the bill for the net windfall gain’ (Jepma 2006: 6–7).
However, consumers should, as explained above, pay for the allowances that energy
producers obtained for free, because the use of those allowance entails opportunity
costs.
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Another misunderstanding is the idea that the emission reduction costs must be
subtracted from the opportunity costs. Instead of using the free allowances, the
energy producer could have sold them and should thus pass on their opportunity
costs to consumers. But if he would actually sell them, he must first reduce his
emissions, which comes at a cost. Some seem to believe that the emission reduction
costs must be subtracted from the opportunity costs, but this is wrong. In the case
that a producer does not reduce pollution in a grandfathering scheme, he faces
opportunity costs of the allowances and no emission reduction costs. In the case that
he does reduce pollution, he not only faces emission reduction costs, but he also
brings in revenues from selling the allowances. The allowances set free through
emission abatement can be seen as a side product of the firm. His profit is the
difference between the revenues from selling the side product, namely allowances,
and its production costs, that is the emission reduction costs. If the producer still
produces some emissions after the abatement, he will have to cover these remaining
emissions with allowances.
1.3 Unsurprising surprise
About 2 or 3 years before 2005, when emissions trading started, the Council of
Ministers decided to use grandfathering in the EU in order to make carbon pricing
acceptable for their industries and to protect their countries’ competitiveness. Only
1 or 2 years after the start of this scheme, politicians were surprised that electricity
companies made windfall profits. However, this should not have been a surprise at
all. The grandfathering of emission rights generates additional cash for electricity
producers, improving the financial position of shareholders. The value of a share
increases, because the electricity company receives an asset with a market value for
free.
What is surprising, though, is that politicians did not know, or maybe act as if
they did not know, that this was going to happen. Already at the end of the 1990s,
Bohm (1999: 21) wrote: ‘Gratis allocation such as grandfathering […] [implies] that
these firms obtain windfall profits (as compared to not being given the permits
gratis)’. More recently, Richard Douthwaite of the Foundation for the Economics of
Sustainability (Feasta) stated in an interview that ‘(…) EU officials who planned the
ETS [EU Emissions Trading Scheme] were aware of the windfall effect, but
opposition from industry would have made it impossible to introduce the ETS if the
permits had not been given away. […] It was essentially a massive bribe’ (in: Cundy
2007: 1). We are not sure as to what politicians did and did not foresee in advance,
but we know for sure that the windfall effect was recognized in the economic
literature several years before the start of emissions trading in the EU.
2 Limits to passing through opportunity costs
In practice, an interesting phenomenon occurs. Electricity producers should fully
incorporate the opportunity costs of grandfathered allowances in their product
prices, but they only do this to a limited extent. In The Netherlands, for instance, the
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rate of passing on the emission price in electricity prices is about 100% in the
electricity spot market. However, for forward sales (e.g. sales made in 2005 to be
delivered in 2006) there is evidence that this rate was only roughly 50% for peak
prices and even less for off peak prices (Frontier Economics 2006).
Sijm et al. (2006) calculate that, with 80% certainty, pass-through rates vary
between 60 and 117% in Germany and between 64 and 81% in The Netherlands.
They explain the high figure for Germany by pointing out that (relatively cheap)
coal generators benefit from higher peak power prices in forward contracts, which
result from (relatively expensive) gas generators setting the marginal power price
during peak hours. Therefore, rising gas prices in 2005 may have led to a modest
overestimation of the pass-through rate for (coal-generated) power in Germany. In
general, they conclude that the pass-through rates in 2005 and 2006 are limited and
vary between 60 and 100% in both countries. In a more recent report, Point Carbon
(2008) concludes that, during the period 2005–2007, pass-through levels vary
between 75 and 100% in both Germany, the United Kingdom and Spain, between 0
and 75% in Italy, and between 45 and 65% in Poland.
Why do electricity producers only partly behave according to what is to be
expected in theory? We distinghuish three groups of explanations for this:
• Oligopolistic nature of the electricity market
• Other market factors (e.g. concerning demand, supply and uncertainty)
• Institutional limitations (e.g. the impact of regulations).
2.1 Oligopolistic markets
Nearly all individual electricity markets, also in the EU, are to be characterized as
oligopolistic (e.g. Gutie´rrez-Alcaraz and Sheble´ 2006). We want to make clear from
the outset that an oligopolistic market structure does not invalidate the opportunity
costs reasoning itself. The passing on of the opportunity costs of free allowances to
consumers is not a consequence of too little competition on the energy market, but a
consequence of the grandfathering design of the emissions trading market. In
passing on those costs, electricity producers are not colluding, but behaving similar
to firms operating on a perfectly competitive energy market.
However, the increase in the cost price of electricity by fully incorporating the
opportunity costs of free allowances is only partly reflected in a higher market price
for electricity. The reason for that phenomenon is, indeed, the oligopolistic structure
of the electricity market (Sijm et al. 2005: 98–103). This is basic micro-economics.
Any increase in costs (thus also the opportunity costs of free allowances) leads to
higher marginal costs, causing the supply curve to shift upwards. First assume a
perfectly competitive electricity market. When demand is inelastic, the aforemen-
tioned cost increase (say, DC) leads to an electricity price increase (say, DP) of the
same magnitude. In symbols: DP = DC. However, when demand is elastic, the
electricity price increase is smaller than the increase in costs, because demand
decreases when the electricity price increases. In symbols: DP \ DC. In such a
competitive market the electricity price is given because no company can influence
the market price: this price then equals marginal revenues. Now introduce the reality
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of an oligopolistic electricity market. In that case, the electricity price is no longer
given because a limited number of companies has some impact on the market price,
so that they face a downward sloping marginal revenue curve. Assuming a similar
aggregate supply curve and elastic demand as in previous case, we again find that
the same cost increase leads to a smaller increase in the electricity price. In symbols:
DP* \ DC (and DP* \ DP). In other words: the opportunity costs of free
allowances are only partly reflected in a higher power price when the electricity
market is oligopolistic. This has nothing to do with those opportunity costs; it has
everything to do with the market structure.
A different question is whether large energy companies could manipulate the
allowance market to make excessive profits. As an answer to this particular
question, we must realize that the impact of such a company on the allowance price
should not be exaggerated. The allowance market has a much larger number of
participants than the electricity market: the EU emissions trading scheme covers
about 10.500 installations in 27 Member States, while electricity producers account
for more than half of total covered emissions (COM 2007; Christiansen et al. 2005).
Convery and Redmond (2007) calculated (based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index) that the electricity-generating sector is not likely to be able to have market
power in the emissions trading market. Nevertheless, it is not the entire number of
yearly allowances that are freely available on the market. A very large part of these
allowances are taken up in production and cannot be freed easily on short notice. To
some extent, their price might thus be affected when a significant amount of
allowances would become available. Ultimately, it is an empirical question whether
a small number of producers can affect allowance prices to an extent that it becomes
observable in electricity prices.
When there is allowance market power of one or more firms, their impact on the
allowance price depends on whether they are buyers or sellers (Hahn 1984;
Westskog 1996). It is in the interest of the seller(s) to keep the allowance price
above the price that clears the market when there is perfect competition. If they
succeed in increasing the market value of grandfathered permits, this higher
allowance price will be passed through in the energy price. This means that all firms
holding such grandfathered emission rights make higher windfall profits than they
would have had under perfect competition. However, the higher price for energy
will also lead to lower demand and thus reduce the profits of their operations in the
energy market. The first-best solution in such a case of abuse of market power is of
course intervention by the EU competition authority, i.e. the European Commission.
2.2 Other market factors
The report by Frontier Economics (2006: 22) mentions several other reasons for a
limited carbon add-on. One of the reasons is that the forward sales of energy for
2005 took place 2 or 3 years earlier, when the emissions trading scheme was not yet
operational. Electricity companies then had expectations of the CO2 price that may
have differed from the market price that emerged when the scheme became
operational. Another reason is that peak electricity prices are so much higher than
the cost price, given their steep demand, that it becomes impossible to discern the
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CO2 mark-up in these peak prices. Furthermore, particular fuels can be used to
produce electricity, such as biomass, which do not cause CO2 emissions and
therefore do not need emission rights to cover them. Moreover, Sijm et al. (2005:
38–39) add that passing through the opportunity costs is more difficult in over-the-
counter (OTC) markets where electricity is traded (not on relatively transparent
power exchanges but) via bilateral, longer-term contracts.
Competition with companies within the EU but outside the emissions trading
scheme also limits possibilities to pass on the opportunity costs of free allowances to
consumers. In EU Member States with a lot of nuclear plants, like France, or in
countries with many hydro installations, like Sweden, fossil fuel plants are not able
to pass through their carbon costs (Sijm et al. 2005). Also international competition
with companies in countries outside the EU emissions trading scheme poses limits
to passing on the carbon mark-up to consumers. This is not relevant for the
electricity sector, since almost no power is imported from outside the EU, but it is
relevant in particular for the aluminium industry (Smale et al. 2006).
Competitors outside the EU and outside the emission trading system need not
include the opportunity costs in their prices. Companies within the EU will then not
be able to pass on the opportunity costs. Their alternative is to stop producing and
sell the allowances. However, if the costs of stopping (namely the loss of value
associated with the liquidation of the plant vs. the value when continued in
production) exceed the benefits of selling their allowances, then these producers will
continue production as if these allowance do not carry an opportunity cost. It is
indeed unlikely that producers will actually leave the market, not only because the
potential value loss associated with scrapping plants is high, but also because most
EU Member States have determined that a producer looses its allocated allowances
when shutting down an installation. Only The Netherlands and Sweden allowed
closed facilities to retain allowances until the end of the trading period (Ellerman
and Buchner 2007: 76).
When energy-intensive industries in the EU would actually relocate to countries
without an emission cap, this would be referred to as ‘‘carbon leakage’’. Emissions
outside the EU would then increase as a direct result of the policy to cap emissions
in the EU. However, based on trade data from 1999 to 2006 in a case study of the
above-mentioned aluminium industry, Reinaud (2008) concludes that carbon
leakage did not yet occur. But she also notes that this may (or may not) change
in a few years time, for instance when long-term electricity contracts expire, making
continued research of this issue desirable.
2.3 Institutional limitations
Neuhoff et al. (2006) argue that power producers expect their current emissions to
be used for the allocation of allowances in a next commitment period. According to
Sijm et al. (2006: 52), this gives producers an incentive to increase output now and
voluntarily restrict the pass-on of the full allowance price to their energy bids.
Moreover, these authors add, among other things, that the regulatory threat of
governments to intervene when energy producers make excessive windfall profits
might induce companies to limit the carbon mark-up. Finally, several authors point
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to the fact that electricity prices in a few countries, such as France, Spain and
Ireland, are subject to regulation which simply prevents operators to pass on the
opportunity costs to the wholesale market (e.g. Matthes et al. 2005: 10; Sijm et al.
2005: 41; Grubb and Neuhoff 2006: 15).
In spite of all this, Grubb and Neuhoff conclude after considering a number of
theoretical and empirical studies: ‘The power sector can and does pass through the
bulk of marginal/opportunity CO2-related costs to the wholesale power markets, as
expected in a competitive system […]’ (Grubb and Neuhoff 2006: 11). Also the
European Commission asserts: ‘In some sectors the degree of outside competition
[…] has limited pass through of the value of allowances. In other sectors, notably
power generation, pass through potential has been more important […]’ (COM
2006a: 4).
3 Options to tackle the windfall profits
The next question is what politicians can do about the windfall profits of the
participants, in particular the electricity producers, in the EU emissions trading
scheme. Below we first analyze the option of forbidding those companies to pass on
the opportunity costs of grandfathered allowances to consumers. We then consider
the options of taxing the windfall profits, strengthening the emission caps and
auctioning the allowances.
3.1 Forbidding the mark-up
Suppose politicians want to tackle the windfall profits problem by making the mark-
up impossible for the electricity producer on the right side of Fig. 1. This would
mean that the market value (of €20) of the emission rights that have been allocated
free of charge is not allowed to show up in the electricity price anymore. The result
is that the market price is pushed back (from €90 at time t = 1) to €70 at time t = 2,
the same price level as before the introduction of emissions trading (at time t = 0).
What would the producer do? The producer would then sell both his power station
and his emission rights. By selling the power station he recovers his initial
investment (less depreciation), which he can invest in assets with a similar risk and
profit profile as he had with the power station, and for the emission rights he
receives €20 per unit of energy on his bank account. The producer is then better-off
(namely €20 per unit of energy) than if he would have continued producing
electricity.
The consequence of this maximum price policy would be that producers exit the
market. Such an exodus would lower the supply of energy. Without price regulation,
the market price would rise as a result of this shortage of supply, to the level where
the electricity price would be €90 again. However, the price regulation makes this
market correction impossible. The exodus would also lead to an additional supply of
emission rights, lowering their prices. It would even lower the market value of
power stations due to the additional supply. No party will be interested to buy power
stations when the energy price is €70. Therefore, the ultimate consequence of
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prohibiting producers from passing on the opportunity costs of allowances is that
such a measure endangers ‘‘security of supply’’, which would thus violate one of
Europe’s core principles of a common energy policy (COM 2006b: 4) and possibly
infringe upon Directive 2005/89/EC on security of electricity supply.
Whether electricity companies will indeed exit the market when the energy price
is forced below the level of their variable costs depends on their expectations. Those
firms might continue production if they expect a more profitable pricing policy in
the foreseeable future in which passing on the opportunity costs of emission rights is
in fact allowed (for instance a possible regime, after 2012, in which all the emission
rights are auctioned off). A producer then accepts a loss now, because he wants to
retain his position on a market where he expects to make profits again in the future.
The closure provisions in most (though not all) EU Member States further reduce
the incentive to leave the market. When a producer closes an installation, he looses
his allowances and he will not receive €20 per unit of energy because he has no
allowances to sell. The implication is that shutting down becomes more expensive.
Those closure rules are inefficient, because they discourage the termination of old
and inefficient plants (e.g. Egenhofer and Fujiwara 2005). Interrupting the
allowance allocation after a plant shuts down can thus be seen as an indirect
subsidy to production. The European Commission even proposed that all closed
installations from 2013 onwards shall no longer receive any allowances for free
(COM 2008: 9).
3.2 Taxing the profits
Some politicians considered to tax the electricity producers for the windfall profits
they made (e.g. a few Social Democrats in Germany and the United Kingdom). A
‘‘windfall tax’’ would not prevent windfall profits from being made ex ante, but it
would tax them ex post, which—presumably—would end those profits.
However, such a tax is a problem for three reasons. First, the tax administration
cannot directly find the opportunity costs on the electricity bills of consumers or in
the bookkeepings of electricity producers. Rather, the opportunity costs are
indirectly implied in the profit and loss statements of producers. Second, a windfall
tax is not easy to define. It implies that the ‘‘normal’’ level of profit for an electricity
producer is objectively measurable. Anything above that level is then a windfall
profit that should be taxed. This would provide producers with an incentive to hide
such profits as costs in their yearly accounts, or to adjust asset values in order to step
up the investment charges in calculating the normal profit. Addressing such
behaviour requires additional, complex regulation with the risk of seriously
inhibiting efficiency. Third, should the tax indeed be successful in transferring the
firms’ opportunity costs to the government, then the impact is similar to forbidding a
full mark-up, which would endanger security of supply. Taxing the windfall is
obviously not the same as forbidding the mark-up, but it does have the same effect.
Because the mark-up on the electricity price will be taxed away immediately by the
government, electricity producers would receive no compensation for the oppor-
tunity costs of their allowances. A producer is then better-off when he sells the
allowances and leaves the energy market.
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Apart from a potential legal incompatibility with Article 10 of Directive 2003/87/
EC which states that emissions shall primarily be allocated free of charge until
2012, the windfall tax soon turned out to be politically unacceptable, because it
would basically force polluters to pay for their allowances. The fact that the industry
accepted the emissions trading scheme in the first place was, of course, because they
did not have to buy their emission rights (as predicted by Baumol and Oates (1988),
for instance).
3.3 Strengthening the caps
Various politicians then proposed to give the electricity companies between 2008
and 2012 a relatively stringent emission target compared to the other sectors in the
system (e.g. the governments of The Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and the
United Kingdom). A year after the scheme had become operational, it turned out
that overall CO2 emissions were about 80 million tonnes or 4% lower than the
number of allowances distributed to installations for 2005. Ellerman and Buchner
(2006: 33) provide two basic explanations for this. First, the emission caps were not
stringent enough, partly because the caps were based on emission estimates and
partly due to lobbying efforts of energy-intensive industries. Second, market
observers had not only overestimated the level of CO2 emissions, but they might
also have underestimated the amount of abatement that would occur. A third,
additional explanation might be that the industry has emitted less than it was
allowed to, creating a perception of over-allocation, because firms wanted to bank
emissions for, say, 2007 on the assumption that by then economic growth and hence
energy use would have increased.
A proposal to ‘‘under-allocate’’ electricity companies between 2008 and 2012 by
giving them a relatively stringent emission target will not solve the problem of
windfall profits. A more stringent emission ceiling would lead to a lower supply of
emission rights (in comparison with demand) and, hence, to a higher price of those
rights. This would not only cause the electricity price to rise, but it could also mean
that the absolute level of windfall profits increases instead of decreases: less
emission rights would be handed out, but they would have a higher value.
To get around this problem of ‘‘less rights with higher values’’ when allocating
less emission rights to the electricity sector, some EU Member States, such as The
Netherlands, have decided to redistribute (part of) those rights to the other
participants in the scheme. The Dutch government, for instance, decided to allocate
15% less rights over the period 2008–2012 to the electricity sector. It will give one-
third of those unallocated rights to non-electricity participants and it will sell two-
thirds on the market. The proceeds of the sale will go to the energy consumers.
Although this redistribution policy does not lead to a higher allowance price, ceteris
paribus, it does imply that the windfall profits will only slightly decrease with about
10% (namely two-thirds of 15%). One-third of the windfall profit will shift to the
non-electricity sectors. Therefore, windfall profits will not disappear at all, which
should be no surprise if one recognizes that grandfathering is the cause of the
windfall profits, not over-allocation.
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3.4 Auctioning the allowances
The discussion above demonstrates that plans to end the windfall profits prior to
2012 are all doomed to fail. For the period after 2012, governments have the option
to auction off the allowances. This was proposed by the European Commission
(COM 2008). The European Council agreed, but also allowed transitional free
allocation for existing electricity generators primarily in Eastern Europe, so that full
auctioning in the power sector will be applied everywhere in the EU only after 2020
(EC 2008). When each electricity producer has to buy emission rights to cover his
CO2 emissions, this implies additional out-of-pocket costs. The producers will then
adjust their product prices to reflect these extra costs. Furthermore, producers will
not report windfall profits anymore in their yearly accounts. The costs of purchasing
emission rights which producers incorporate in their product prices under auctioning
are easier to accept for consumers than the argument that the opportunity costs of
free rights are to be passed on to them under grandfathering. Auctioning is then
consistent with an ‘‘extended’’ interpretation of the polluter-pays principle which
includes both efficiency and fairness, because polluting firms need to buy the
emission rights instead of enriching their shareholders (Woerdman et al. 2008). By
auctioning the allowances, the capital gift will shift from the shareholders of energy
companies to the government. Consequently, in its post-2012 proposal, the
European Commission correctly stated that ‘auctioning (…) should also eliminate
windfall profits’ (COM 2008: 14).
4 Auctioning as a first-best solution?
The upshot of the discussion above is that auctioning is the first-best solution from
an economic perspective: it eliminates windfall profits, prices the marginal CO2 unit
and provides incentives to innovate (e.g. Cramton and Kerr 1998). Some authors
also expect that auctioning will provide a clearer long-term price signal (Hepburn
et al. 2006). Until 2012, only 10% of the emissions rights is allowed to be auctioned
off: at least 90% has to be allocated for free, according to Article 10 of the EU
Directive on emissions trading. After 2012, the auctioning rate for the electricity
sector will be 100%, but transitional free allocation is possible for existing power
plants in Member States with a poor interconnectivity of their electricity grid or in
relatively poor Member States where more than 30% of the electricity is produced
with a single fossil fuel (such as coal; EC 2008: 14). However, in those particular
Member States the auctioning rate must be at least 30% in 2013 and will be
progressively raised to 100% no later than 2020. This means that after 2020, the
auctioning rate for the power industry will be 100% everywhere in the EU.
As opposed to emissions trading based on auctioning, some economists argue in
favour of a carbon tax which would also imply that energy producers stop making
windfall profits (e.g. Shapiro 2007; Jepma 2006). Additional advantages are carbon
price certainty and avoidance of lobbying on the allocation of allowances, its
advocators claim. However, the biggest problem of the early climate policy tools in
the 1990s was that they were unable to prevent carbon emissions from rising
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(Woerdman 2004). A carbon tax suffers from a similar problem: it is less
environmentally effective than a cap-and-trade scheme. The substitute for a
common cap-and-trade scheme in the EU is a uniform carbon tax. Because
information is incomplete, the European Commission becomes involved in a trial-
and-error process of (re)adjusting the tax rate trying to reach the EU emission target.
Moreover, economic growth tends to increase the consumption of fossil fuels and
thus requires steady upward adjustments of the carbon tax. Lobbying and resistance
from the industry is to be expected every time that the tax increase is necessary to
attain the emission target.
Auctioning will put an end to the windfall profits, but unfortunately it also has its
drawbacks. Apart from the difficulties of auction design, auctioning could spark a
‘‘secondary allocation debate’’ by shifting the allocation problem to the issue of how
to recycle the auction revenues (Egenhofer and Fujiwara 2005: 26). Should the
revenues be redistributed to the power producers as a compensation for the costs
they have to make to comply with the new regulation, should the revenues go to
consumers as a compensation for their higher energy bill, or should it flow into the
treasury of the state? And in the latter case, should the additional state revenues be
used to finance climate-friendly technologies, to lower taxes on labour, or to support
other (non-environmental but) socially desirable projects?
Interestingly, in a survey of 151 firms in the United Kingdom, 75% of them wants
to see the funds raised by environmental taxation or regulation to be spent on green
initiatives (Manning and Howlett 2007: 15). The other option of letting the auction
revenues flow back to the industry by lowering labour taxes is generally preferred
by economists and would imply a cost shift: pollution costs more, labour costs less
(Goulder 1995).
This issue of what to do with the auction revenues should not be dismissed lightly.
The comparable problem of what to do with the revenues from a carbon tax even
partly explains why such a tax was eventually rejected. Jos Delbeke, DG
environment at the European Commission and designer of a carbon tax proposal
in the 1990s, said in an interview: ‘The level of the tax was quite significant. And that
was part of the problem. […] It’s very difficult to discuss a tax measure. It’s even
more difficult to agree on what to do with the revenues’ (in: Jones 2007: 2).
Nevertheless, the EU accepted more auctioning of allowances after 2012, not only
because windfall profits caused so much political turmoil, but also because emissions
trading was legally embedded, institutionally ‘‘locked-in’’, in all Member States and
their companies, making a shift in the allocation regime a relatively small step.
The European Commission proposed to use at least 20% of the auction revenues
for environmental purposes, such as renewable energies, carbon capture and storage,
and avoidance of deforestation in developing countries (COM 2008: 23). The
European Parliament wanted to earmark at least 50% of those revenues for climate
measures in developing countries (EP 2008: 15). The European Council decided that
Member States can determine the use of auction revenues themselves and takes note
of their willingness to use at least 50% of those revenues for actions to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, partly in developing countries (EC 2008: 7). The
European Council thus shifted the ‘‘secondary allocation debate’’ to Member State
level.
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Another problem of auctioning off the allowances is that it will deteriorate the net
cash flow of EU companies facing outside-system competition, like the aluminium
industry. As argued above, these companies will not be able to pass on the costs of
these allowances to their buyers. Their net cash flow will decrease with an amount
equal to the amount paid for the auctioned allowances. Firms with the prospect of
negative long-run profitability of their operations, which might hold out for a while
when allowances are grandfathered, have a stronger incentive to stop immediately
when allowances are auctioned due to liquidity and solvency problems. The
European Council therefore decided to allow 100% free allocation of allowances for
(sub)sectors exposed to international competition and thus to a significant risk of
carbon leakage (EC 2008: 2).
Auctioning also raises an intriguing fairness trade-off. Auctioning is more
acceptable than grandfathering to energy consumers, because it removes the
windfall profits. However, grandfathering is more acceptable than auctioning to
energy producers, because they receive an asset with a market value for free (e.g.
Harrison et al. 2007). In the 1990s, the electricity producers opposed the proposal of
a carbon tax, but they accepted the idea of an emissions trading scheme, precisely
because they did not have to pay for their emissions via grandfathering. One might
argue that changing the ‘‘rules of the game’’ by introducing auctioning is not
entirely fair to its main players: the energy companies. They are now basically
‘‘locked’’ into the system and may perceive such a step as a form of opportunistic
behaviour by the government. Moreover, we have seen that producers do not fully
incorporate the opportunity costs in their electricity prices. With auctioning it is
improbable that such a limited pass-on can continue. Therefore, consumers might
actually be better off under grandfathering than under auctioning.
Auctioning may be the first-best solution in terms of ending windfall profits, one
particular aspect of the emissions trading scheme, but it is a second-best solution in
terms of political acceptability for the emissions trading scheme as a whole. The
first aspect explains the choice for more auctioning after 2012, but the second aspect
explains its gradual introduction and the exemptions created for particular industries
and Member States.
5 Conclusion
Theoretically, the instrument of emissions trading is not only effective as a result of
the emission caps, but it is also efficient. Each unit of carbon has a price: either the
price of purchasing emission rights or the opportunity costs of using the rights. In
addition, emissions trading gives an incentive to innovate, since costly emission
reduction technology now also generates revenues by selling the emission rights that
become available. This makes it more attractive to invest in cleaner technologies.
However, the emissions trading scheme in the EU suffers from overindulgent
emission caps and windfall profits made by energy companies. Our analysis revealed
that windfall profits resulting from grandfathering is not the same as an over-
allocation resulting from lenient emission caps. Energy companies would also make
windfall profits in case of stringent caps by incorporating the (higher) market value of
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(less) grandfathered allowances in the energy price. Moreover, we emphasize that
grandfathering entails costs for firms, namely the opportunity costs of the emission
rights when they are used for covering the emissions. Instead of using the allowances,
the firm could have sold those emission rights. These costs are part of the cost price
and thus have to be incorporated in the energy price. An energy producer will not sell
his allowances only if he can earn the revenue forgone via the electricity price.
Energy consumers consider the carbon mark-up to be more acceptable when
energy producers directly had to purchase the allowances at an auction. The costs of
purchasing emission rights which producers incorporate in their product prices
under auctioning are easier to accept for consumers than the argument that the
opportunity costs of free rights are to be passed on to them under grandfathering.
Because auctioning is allowed to a very limited extent until 2012, shareholders can
enjoy the financial benefits of grandfathering at least for a few more years to come.
Emissions trading based on either auctioning or grandfathering is an efficient
instrument to reach the emission target. Windfall profits arise under grandfathering
because energy companies receive a capital gift, making their shareholders richer.
This is not a surprise, but it is a fact that was known in the literature years before the
start of the scheme. In that sense, windfall profits are a political problem, not an
economic problem. A few years ago, grandfathering was the political solution to
make the pricing of carbon acceptable to energy producers. Today, grandfathering is
seen as a political problem, because energy consumers find the windfall profits of
the producers unfair. Politicians face the dilemma that auctioning may strengthen
fairness for consumers, but undermines fairness for producers. Nevertheless, this
difficult equity trade-off does not undermine the efficiency of the scheme at large.
The EU decided to auction off allowances to electricity producers after 2012, but
also created exemptions allowing transitional free allocation primarily in Eastern
European Member States until 2020. This not only means that the debate on
windfall profits will come to an end, but also that the controversy will remain for
more than a decade to come. The political turmoil is not over yet.
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